



IIF (IUCC Identity Federation)

Level of Assurance

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1 Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119.

2 Purpose and Scope

This document defines the lowest common level of assurance required for all members of the IUCC Identity Federation (IIF). This identity assurance profile does not represent LoA 1 in the sense of NIST SP 800-63, but should rather be thought of as an 'unspecified' LoA.

A claim at this level of assurance implies roughly the following:

- The subject is probably affiliated with the IIF member
- The subject is very likely a human and not a robot or piece of software
- The subject is most likely identified by a unique permanent user identifier
- Relying parties in IIF may require elevated levels of assurance.

3 Compliance and Audit

Evidence of compliance with this profile **MUST** be part of the Identity Management Practice Statement, maintained as a part of the IIF membership process. No audits are required for this identity assurance profile.

4 Requirements

4.1 Organisation

- The organisation operating the identity provider **MUST** be a part of the IIF member organisation or under contract with an IIF member organisation.

4.2 Identity proofing and registration

- All subjects **MUST** at least with some degree of certainty represent a physical person affiliated with the IIF member organisation. Using CAPTCHAs or relying on an identity proofing process that uses CAPTCHAs (or a technical control of comparable reliability) is a minimally acceptable way of establishing 'humanness' with a sufficient degree of certainty for this assurance profile.

4.3 Credentials Issuance and Technology

- Each subject **MUST** be represented by an identifier ("username") which **MUST** be unique for the Identity Provider.
- Subject unique identifiers **SHOULD** not be re-assigned unless the unique identifier is known to be unused by all relying parties.
- If subjects are allowed access to self-service reset of credentials then either another trusted credential or a one-time password **MUST** be used.
- Subjects **MUST** be actively discouraged from sharing credentials with other subjects either by using technical controls or by requiring users to confirm policy forbidding sharing of credentials.
- Measures **MUST** be taken to reducing the vulnerability of credentials to password guessing attacks.
- Relying Party and Identity Provider credentials (i.e entity keys) **MUST NOT** use shorter comparable key strength (in the sense of NIST SP 800-57) than a 2048 bit RSA key and **MUST** be changed at least every 3 years.

4.4 Security and Management of Authentication Events

- Secrets, credentials or long-term keys used in authentication (for instance when authenticating to an Identity Provider) **MUST** be encrypted if transmitted across open networks (eg. the Internet or Campus networks).
- Any authentication protocols used when authenticating subjects **MUST** require a proof-of-possession step for subject credentials.
- For regular passwords this involves validating that the user knows her/his password.
- Any session tokens **MUST** be cryptographically authenticated.
- Authentication mechanisms **MUST** be protected against common attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks, eaves-dropper attacks and off-line password guessing.

4.5 Identity Assertion Content

- Each claim **MUST** contain a permanent identifier of the subject. This identifier **MAY** be specific to a singly relying party (a so called targeted identifier) or a shared common identifier.
- Each identity claim **MUST** include a unique representation of the administrative domain associated with the Identity Provider. This identifier **MUST NOT** be used unless it has been assigned to the Identity Provider by the SWAMID Operations Team.

5 **Technical Operational Environment**

- The servers and other infrastructure involved in the operation of identity providers or relying parties **MUST** be maintained according to best practice.

6 **Technical representation**

For all technology profiles compliance with this identity assurance profile is equivalent with the existence of a valid identity provider issuing valid identity claims.